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DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
AFFECT CSR DISCLOSURE? THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNANCE
Há Influência do ambiente institucional nas práticas de divulgação de RSC? O 
papel da governança
¿El entorno institucional influye en las prácticas de revelación de información 
de la RSC? El papel del Gobierno Corporativo
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to analyze whether the institutional environment has a direct effect on Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting practices or if this effect is explained by the influence of the 
institutional environment on Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms. To conduct our study, we focused 
on two countries that reflect different types of institutional environment: relation-based (Brazil) and 
rule-based (Spain). Based on our results, we can affirm that the institutional environment influences 
CG mechanisms (Board Size and Reference Shareholder) as well as companies’ CSR disclosure. Additio-
nally, the CG mechanisms affected by the institutional environment also help to explain differences in 
CSR reporting practices. As relation-based societies evolve into rules-based environments, the informa-
tion disclosed about CSR becomes more complex due to a strengthening of CG mechanisms.
KEYWORDS | Corporate governance, disclosure, corporate social responsibility, institutional environ-
ment, ownership structure. 
RESUMO
O objetivo desta investigação é examinar se o efeito do ambiente institucional sobre as práticas de 
divulgação de informações de Responsabilidade Social Corporativa (RSC) é direto ou se é devido à 
influência desse ambiente sobre as características de Governança Corporativa (GC). Neste sentido, 
são comparados dois ambientes institucionais: o Brasil, porque é centrado nas relações, e a Espa-
nha, porque é centrada em normas. A partir dos resultados obtidos, pode-se deduzir que o ambiente 
institucional influencia características da GC (Tamanho do Conselho de Administração e Acionista de 
Referência), bem como a divulgação sobre a RSC. Além disso, essas características da GC são influen-
ciadas pelo ambiente institucional e, por sua vez, explicam as diferenças encontradas nas práticas 
de divulgação de informações de RSC. Assim, à medida que as sociedades centradas nas relações 
evoluem para outras centradas em normas, as informações divulgadas sobre RSC tornam-se mais 
complexas, devido ao fortalecimento das características da GC.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Governança corporativa, divulgação de informações, responsabilidade social cor-
porativa, cultura nacional, estrutura acionista.
RESUMEN
El objetivo es examinar si el efecto que el entorno institucional ejerce sobre la información divulgada sobre 
la Responsabilidad Social Corporativa (RSC) es directo o si se explica por la influencia que este entorno tiene 
sobre las características del Gobierno Corporativo. Para ello, se comparan dos entornos institucionales dis-
tintos: Brasil (Centrado en las Relaciones) y España (Centrado en las Normas). Considerando los resultados 
concluimos que el entorno ejerce una influencia sobre los mecanismos del Gobierno Corporativo (Tamaño 
del Consejo y Accionista de Referencia), y la divulgación de la Responsabilidad Social Corporativa. Además, 
estas características del Gobierno Corporativo, afectadas por el entorno, son las que a su vez explican estas 
diferencias encontradas en las prácticas de divulgación de información sobre la Responsabilidad Social 
Corporativa. En la medida en la que las sociedades Centradas en las Relaciones evolucionen hacia otras 
Centradas en las Normas, la información divulgada sobre la Responsabilidad Social Corporativa será más 
compleja debido al fortalecimiento de los mecanismos del Gobierno Corporativo.
PALABRAS CLAVE | Gobierno corporativo, divulgación de información, responsabilidad social corpo-
rativa, entorno institucional, estructura de propiedad.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, the importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
in business is undeniable (Lee, 2008) as well as the relevance 
of CSR communication strategy. Despite the diversity of options 
available to disclose about CSR (Ihlen, Bartlett, & May, 2011), 
most companies have chosen to do it by means of a CSR/
sustainability report. 
The publication of sustainability reports has increased 
significantly in recent years (KPMG, 2011) even though CSR 
disclosure is not mandatory in most countries. Studies have 
pointed a few reasons behind this growth in CSR disclosure, 
particularly the responsibility of companies towards their 
stakeholders in the pursuit of legitimacy (Crowther, 2000), the 
rewards companies expect for their socially/ environmentally 
friendly behaviors and for decreasing information asymmetries 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004), and the various pressures 
from their environment (Young & Marais, 2012).
According to previous empirical evidence, the majority 
of these external pressures come from the industry (Sweeney & 
Coughlan, 2008) and the institutional environment in which they 
operate (Adams, 2002; Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Golob & Bartlett, 
2007; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015; 
Prado, Gallego, & García, 2009), which clearly determines the 
degree of engagement in CSR disclosure practices.
It is theoretically consistent with Institutional Theory to affirm 
that organizations adapt their structures and policies to institutional 
norms (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) in order to survive in the market. 
However, research on the effects of the institutional environment 
can be complex due to the significant difficulty to isolate variables 
and distinguish those effects from the impact the institutional 
environment has on other internal-context variables (Adams, 2002). 
In this perspective, we should consider that this 
institutionalization process also affects Corporate Governance 
(CG) mechanisms (Charkham, 1994; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
These mechanisms are not limited to the Board of Directors (BD), 
comprehending also other features of the ownership structure 
of companies.
The considerations above and the evidence that 
sustainability disclosure policies emerge from BD (as supported 
by Agency and Stakeholder Theories – Freeman, 1984; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) motivate us to inquire whether the institutional 
environment has a direct effect on CSR reporting practices or if this 
effect is partially explained by the influence that the institutional 
environment has on companies’ CG characteristics.
Consequently, the aim of this article is to analyze whether 
the institutional environment has a direct effect on CSR reporting 
practices of if this effect is explained by the influence of the 
institutional environment on CG mechanisms.
According to suggestions by several researchers (Adams, 
2002; Young & Marais, 2012) and considering the aim of our study, 
we focused on a comparison between two countries: Brazil and 
Spain. This is because these country’s institutional environments 
are clearly different (Li & Filer, 2007) and because both countries 
have been considered pioneers or top-ranked in the reporting of 
CSR information (Gallego, Formigoni, & Antunes, 2014; Grecco, Filho, 
Segura, García, & Rodríguez, 2013; KPMG, 2013; Sierra, Zorio, & 
García, 2013). Additionally, according to previous empirical evidence, 
there are differences concerning CG mechanisms: Brazilian 
companies’ BDs are weaker and less effective than Spanish ones 
(Andrés, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Black, Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010).
Thus, our sample consists of 125 listed companies from 
Brazil and Spain with CG and financial data available at the 
ASSET4 Database (an international database with information 
about listed companies’ CG and CSR).
In our study, we used measures that reflect the complexity of 
companies’ CSR reporting. We used an index intended to reflect CSR 
reporting practices; we considered also the actions taken to increase 
the credibility and quality of such disclosures (Amran, Lee, & Devi, 
2014; Boiral, 2013); the extent to which the disclosed information 
followed the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) guidelines; whether 
such adequacy was subject to external checking; and, finally, whether 
the information had been assured. With regard to CG mechanisms, we 
focused on the ones indicated by the literature as having an influence 
on CSR reporting practices: Board Size, Board Independence, Board 
Activity, CSR Committee, and Reference Shareholder. 
Considering our results, we can affirm that the institutional 
environment has a strong influence on the complexity of the CSR 
reporting practices as well as on two of the CG mechanisms analyzed: 
Board size and the presence of a Reference Shareholder. Moreover, 
these two CG characteristics are the ones that significantly affect 
CSR disclosure. When CG variables are introduced in the analysis, 
the institutional environment alone no longer has any significant 
effect on CSR reporting. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
effect of the institutional environment on CSR reporting practices 
is mediated by CG mechanisms, particularly Board Size and the 
existence of a Reference Shareholder.
With regard to the composition of our sample, it is worth 
highlighting that, in rule-based societies, the information 
disclosed about CSR presents a higher level of complexity than 
in relation-based societies. 
The present article is organized as follows. In the next two 
sections, we focus on the theoretical framework adopted, a review 
of the literature, and the development of our hypotheses. In the 
following section, we look more closely into the sample and the 
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variables chosen, as well as the methodologies employed. After 
that, we present the results of our study and a discussion about 
our subject. Finally, in the last section, we present our conclusions, 
the limitations of the study, and mention some of the lines of 
investigation that remain open.
CSR DISCLOSURE
Communicating CSR has become a priority for companies in order 
to ensure the satisfaction of stakeholders’ demands. Although 
there is a wide range of alternatives for how to report about CSR 
(Ihlen et al., 2011), most companies choose to include CSR-related 
information in their official written documents since markets, 
investors and stakeholders usually recognize this way better than 
other options (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995).
Once a company has decided to report about CSR in its 
documents, the next step is to choose whether it is going to do that 
in its annual reports or through a more specific document, i.e., the 
sustainability or CSR report. This document aims to inform stakeholders 
about the social, environmental and economic impact (Triple Bottom 
Line approach – Elkington, 1998) of companies’ activities during a 
given financial year (Rodríguez, Frías, & García, 2014).
In recent years, there has been an increase in the 
information disclosed about CSR (KPMG, 2013). However, the 
credibility and quality of CSR reports have been challenged (Boiral, 
2013; Amran et al., 2014). Consequently, companies have started 
to implement some more complex CSR disclosure practices in 
order to make their reports more credible.
Thus, companies can decide to report according to 
international standards (GRI guidelines) in order to enable the 
comparison and harmonization of CSR information between 
companies (Adams, 2002; Boiral, 2013). Later, these reports 
can get a specific “application level”, which reflects to what 
extent each company’s report follows the GRI guidelines. Kolk 
and Perego (2010), García, Sierra, and Zorio (2013), and Castelo, 
Delgado, Ferreira, and Pereira (2014), among other scholars, argue 
that the adoption of the GRI guidelines is an important driver for 
enhancing the quality of CSR/sustainability reports. Moreover, 
this application level can be self-reported or externally checked 
(by a third-party or GRI). In this respect, the external checking of 
a CSR report’s adequacy to GRI gives more credibility to the report 
(Fernández, Romero, & Ruiz, 2012; Prado et al., 2009).
Finally, the maximum level of information complexity is 
provided by the assurance of the CSR report. This is generally 
perceived as a mechanism to secure CSR reports’ credibility 
(Fernández, Romero, & Ruiz, 2014; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 
2009) and quality (García et al., 2013; Perego & Kolk, 2012).
CSR REPORTING, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Several researchers have inquired about what factors could explain 
the differences found in CSR disclosure practices. Empirical 
evidence suggests that, in addition to industry pressures and 
the institutional environment, other factors that can significantly 
affect CSR reporting practices are company size, profitability and 
CG mechanisms.
Firstly, differences in the level of adoption of CSR disclosure 
practices have been detected between companies depending 
on their size (Clarkson, Overell, & Chapple, 2011; Fernández et 
al., 2012). Normally, company size is significantly and positively 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Belkaoui & 
Karpik, 1989; Hackston & Milne, 1996). More recently, several 
researchers have confirmed that a firm’s size can play a relevant 
role in its CSR disclosure (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Michelon 
et al., 2015; Rodríguez et al., 2014).
In contrast, the relationship between profitability and 
voluntary disclosure is not completely clear. However, main 
disclosure theories, such as Agency and Political Cost theories, 
argue for a positive correlation (Reverte, 2009). Nevertheless, 
most of the empirical evidence has not found any significant 
results on CSR disclosure (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Rodríguez 
et al., 2014; Said, Zainuddin, & Haron, 2009).
On the other hand, the responsibility for CSR disclosure 
decisions lies with the BD (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Rodríguez 
et al., 2014). This is theoretically supported by Agency (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) and Stakeholder (Freeman, 1984) theories. 
According to these theories, the BD seeks to safeguard the 
interests of all stakeholders by disclosing information that 
increases transparency, thus reducing information asymmetry 
and avoiding opportunistic behaviors.
Based on these arguments, several researches (Amran et 
al., 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; 
Rodríguez et al., 2014; Said et al., 2009) have tried to identify the 
CG mechanisms that have an effect on CSR disclosure practices. 
There are several BD characteristics (BD size, level of activity of 
the BD, presence of independent directors in the BD), as well as 
other CG mechanisms (the existence of a CSR Committee in the 
company and the presence of a Reference Shareholder), that seem 
to show an effect on sustainability disclosure practices (Amran 
et al., 2014; Said et al., 2009).
Empirical evidence about the connection between 
board size and disclosure is not completely clear, although 
this connection seems to be related with board effectiveness. 
While several studies argue that smaller boards are more 
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effective because having fewer members contributes to decrease 
communication and coordination problems (Andrés et al., 2005; 
Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996), others 
advocate the convenience of larger boards as these could manage 
more effectively the complexity of today’s business environments 
(Frías, Rodríguez, & García, 2013; Gandía, 2008; Kent & Stewart, 
2008; Willekens, Bauwhede, Gaeremynck, & Gucht, 2005). This 
debate about effectiveness is also extended to the level of activity 
of BDs. In this respect, some researchers argue that more active 
boards would be more effective (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992), while 
others have suggested that an excessive number of meetings 
implies less effectiveness (Vafeas, 1999).
In both cases (Board size and level of activity), BD 
effectiveness is closely linked to the information disclosed by 
companies (García, Rodríguez, & Gallego, 2011). In other words, 
evidence suggests that more effective boards would disclose 
more information, which includes more information about CSR.
Another aspect of this governance mechanism that is 
commonly examined is board independence. The literature has 
shown board independence to be positively associated with 
disclosure practices since independent directors are less aligned 
with the management, and encourage firms to disclose more 
and increase information quality as an attempt to protect the 
interests of all stakeholders (Forker, 1992; Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012; among others). Nevertheless, some contributions show a 
negative relationship (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Prado & García, 
2010), while others identify a non-significant relationship (Frías 
et al., 2013; García et al., 2011).
According to Ullman (1985), the establishment of a CSR 
Committee is an obvious indication of the company’s CSR 
engagement level. Since one of the functions of this committee is 
to ensure the quality of the company’s sustainability disclosure, 
the existence of a CSR Committee can be viewed as a sign of 
the company’s commitment to stakeholders, in line with the 
evidence found by Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) and Amran 
et al. (2014).
The last CG mechanism that the literature points as capable 
of affecting CSR disclosure is the existence of a Reference 
Shareholder (someone who has the majority of voting rights, 
veto power or golden share in a company). Ownership structure 
is identified as one of the key elements that explain international 
variations in the CG structure (Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 
1990; Porta et al., 1999). The presence of a Reference Shareholder 
is one of the most relevant characteristics of ownership which 
will certainly affect the company’s strategic decisions as he/she 
has enough power to appoint directors to the board (Boyd, 1994). 
Considering that several characteristics of the BD can affect CSR 
reporting practices, as discussed earlier, one can see the potential 
influence that the existence of a Reference Shareholder would 
have on CSR disclosure practices.
Additionally, Agency Theory (Ross, 1973) also contribute 
in this line of thought as some authors argue that shareholders 
are more in favor of CSR than managers (Miras, Escobar, & 
Carrasco, 2014) since the former are concerned about long-term 
repercussions and aware of the negative consequences of not 
being socially responsible (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003). Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: CG mechanisms have an influence on CSR reporting 
practices.
Furthermore, many researchers have stated the relevant 
role that industry plays on CSR disclosure (Fifka, 2013; Kolk & 
Perego, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009; Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008). In 
this respect, the main arguments affirm that the nature of activities 
determines the industry’s attitude to social responsibility along 
with the need for legitimization in the markets or the need for 
improving firms’ reputation due to the negative impact of their 
activities (greenwashing). 
Finally, companies are also under another kind of pressure 
to disclose about CSR, i.e., pressure from their institutional 
environment (Adams, 2002; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Lattemann, 
Fetscherin, Alon, Li, & Schneider, 2009). This is theoretically 
supported by Institutional Theory, which states that organizations 
are continuously adapting their structures and policies to the 
institutional norms and cultural context in which they operate 
(Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1994) as an attempt 
to survive in the markets. Apart from the influence of regulation 
in each institutional environment, companies will imitate 
the successful behavior or practices carried out by their peer 
organizations (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). This is the argument 
followed by North (1991) and Williamson (2000) when they try to 
explain the concept of institutional environment.
The most relevant evidence in the literature that enhances 
the existence of this relationship was highlighted by Adams 
(2002): (1) the strong dependence between the issues that 
are worthy reporting and the institutional environment; (2) the 
divergences found in companies’ main CSR concerns also depend 
on the institutional environment; and (3) stakeholders’ demands 
for firms to be socially responsible vary according to differences 
in the institutional environment. Considering all these arguments, 
our second hypothesis affirms that:
H2: CSR disclosure is different depending on the 
institutional environment in which the company operates.
Nevertheless, Adams (2002) pointed out the complexity 
of analyzing the institutional environment’s influence since it is 
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very difficult to isolate the contextual variables and to differ its 
influence from the indirect effects derived from the influence that the 
institutional environment has on the other internal context variables.
This brings us to consider whether the effects of the 
institutional environment on CSR reporting is not direct but 
could be explained instead by the mediation of CG mechanisms, 
a mediation that is strongly influenced by the institutional 
environment (Doidge et al., 2007; Klapper & Love, 2004; Li & 
Harrison, 2008a, 2008b) and, at the same time, significantly 
relevant to CSR disclosure practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).
On the one hand, Charkham (1994) and Porta et al. (1999) 
remarked that one of the significant effects of the institutional 
environment on the internal variables of companies is the 
variation in corporate ownership structures. In this perspective, 
Klapper and Love (2004) and Doidge et al. (2007) highlighted two 
country-related characteristics that are determinant in the impact 
of institutional environment: investor protection and the costs of 
accessing capital markets. The empirical evidence in this respect 
(Li & Harrison, 2008a, 2008b) confirms that CG structures are 
strongly affected by the institutional environment, particularly 
Board Size and Board’s Independence. Consequently, our third 
hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Corporate Governance mechanisms are influenced 
by the institutional environment in which the company 
operates.
Considering Adams’s (2002) argument regarding the 
difficulty to determine whether the effect of the institutional 
environment on CSR reporting practices is direct or if it is 
explained by the influence that this environment has on other 
internal variables – in this case the CG mechanisms – we state 
our fourth hypothesis:
H4: The influence that the institutional environment has 
on CSR disclosure is explained by the mediating role of CG 
mechanisms.
Figure 1 shows the relationships between the three main 
variables discussed in this theoretical section as well as the 
theoretical framework which supports them.
Figure 1. Map of the relationships between the three main variables
National
culture Institutional
theory
Stakeholders and
Agency
Theories
Institutional
Theory
CG mechanisms
CSR reporting
practices
METHODOLOGY
This study is predominantly explanatory and uses a quantitative 
approach. In this section, the study’s sample selection, variables 
and statistical method are explained. 
Country selection and sample 
Previous research about CSR disclosure has taken the institutional 
environment of the company into consideration in different 
ways. On the one hand, there are some studies that assume 
this influence by focusing only on one institutional environment 
(Gallego et al., 2014; Kuo, Yeh, & Yu, 2012; Michelon et al., 
2015; Paul et al., 2006, Prado et al., 2009) or by controlling its 
effect in multinational samples (Alon, Lattemann, Fetscherin, Li, 
& Schneider, 2010; Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Fortanier, Kolk, & 
Pinkse, 2011).
On the other hand, other studies try to determine the 
impact that different institutional environments have on CSR 
reporting practices (Adams, 2002; Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Grecco 
et al., 2013; Tschopp, 2005; Young & Marais, 2012). One of the 
characteristics of this kind of research is that it is mainly focused 
on developed countries, although their institutional environments 
vary according to two classifications: Variety of Capitalism (VOC) 
(Hall & Solskic, 2001) and the Governance Index Environment 
(GEI ) (Li & Filer, 2007).
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The latter has allowed expanding the scope of research since 
it classifies each society either as a Rule-Based or a Relation-Based 
environment (Li, Park, & Li, 2004). To that end, GEI considers five 
relevant aspects of each environment: political rights, rule of law, 
free press, the quality of accounting standards, and general trust 
levels. In Rule-Based environments, regulation is transparent and 
efficient, and, consequently, the information reported by companies 
is credible. However, the control exercised by the government in 
Relation-Based environments can trigger a general mistrust in the 
information provided, and companies feel less pressure to disclose 
about their practices (Lattemann et al., 2009).
Consequently, we are going to test our hypothesis focusing 
on the comparison between Rule-Based and Relation-Based 
environments, which are measured by the GEI Index (a positive 
score means a Rule-Based environment, while a negative one 
means a Relation-Based society). In order to choose the concrete 
institutional environments for our investigation, the CSR reporting 
practices were relevant, as well as the CG mechanisms. Therefore, 
we decided to focus on two countries with a high level of CSR 
reporting and a Code of Good Governance. 
This is why our sample consists of Spanish and Brazilian 
listed companies (according with the GEI index, Brazil is identified 
as a Relation-Based environment, while Spain belongs to the 
Rule-Based group).
Both countries have been identified as pioneers in the CSR 
reporting field in their respective geographic regions. While Brazil 
has proved a leading country in Latin America in the publication 
of CSR reports (Gallego et al., 2014), Spain is widely recognized 
for its companies’ CSR reporting practices (Sierra et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, differences are reported in the percentage of CSR 
report-publishing companies and the level of GRI adoption; the 
assurance of CSR reports is recognized by KPMG (2013) and Grecco 
et al. (2013).
Additionally, the Codes of Good Governance in effect are 
from 2009, in the case of Brazil, and 2006, in Spain. Their main 
recommendations are summarized in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1. Key characteristics of the Codes of Good Governance of Brazil and Spain 
Corporate governance characteristics Brazil Spain
board size Between 5 and 11 Between 5 and 15
Independent directors Most should be independent At least more than 33%
Board activity
It is suggested that the frequency of 
meetings should not exceed one per month
No recommendation
CSR Committee Suggested, although not further elaborated No recommendation
Source: Codes of Good Governance of Spain and Brazil.
Previous research about CG in Brazil (Black et al., 2010) 
pointed out the need to strengthen the BDs of Brazilian companies 
since they have boards too small to be effective, and a significant 
percentage of Brazilian boards has no independent directors at 
all. This problem is common to most BRICS countries (Estrin & 
Prevezer, 2011). On the other hand, Andrés et al. (2005) analyzed 
the characteristics of BDs in OECD countries to get insights about 
their effectiveness. Spanish BDs are medium-sized, mostly formed 
by independent directors (75%) and quite active (8.57 meetings 
per year).
Initially, 128 companies from Brazil and Spain were 
selected because of two reasons: (1) the information about their 
CSR disclosure practices was available at Corporate Registers, 
the GRI website, or, in a few cases, directly at the company’s 
website (even when there was no formal CSR report); and (2) their 
CG data were available at the ASSET4 Database. This database 
is frequently used by academics (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012) 
and investors to build their sustainability reports. It provides 
a collection of indicators (valued from 0 to 100) organized in 
four pillars: Social Scores, Environmental Scores, Corporate 
Governance Scores, and Economic Scores. The financial data 
were provided by the DataStream database. Because some pieces 
of information were not available for three companies, we have 
to remove those companies from our sample.
Once we had our final sample composition (125 companies), 
we proceeded to analyze their CSR disclosure practices based 
on their CSR reports, annual reports or integrated reporting. 
This information about CSR reporting practices refers to the 
financial year 2012 because it was the last available year for the 
complete sample (the lag between the year covered and the date 
of publication is from 1 to 2 years – Boiral, 2013). For the cases 
in which there was no coincidence between the natural year and 
the financial year, we used the most recent report available (from 
2011-2012 or 2012-2013).
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Variables: Dependent, independent and control
Exhibit 2 shows how each variable (dependent, independent and control) was measured in this study.
Exhibit 2. Measurement of variables
Variable Measurement Source
Dependent 
variable
CSR index
(1) CSR information in a report Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers (1995)
(2) GRI adoption level Adams (2002), Boiral (2013)
(3) Externally checked
Prado, Gallego, & García (2009), Fernández, 
Romero, & Ruiz (2012)
(4) Assurance of the CSR report
Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua (2009), Fernández, 
Romero, & Ruiz (2014)
Corporate 
governance
Board size Number of directors De Andrés et al. (2005); García et al. (2011)
Independent 
directors
Percentage of independent directors Haniffa & Cooke (2005); Prado & García (2010)
Board activity Number of board meetings Rodríguez et al. (2014)
CSR committee
Existence of a CSR committee. Dummy 
variable. Indicator variable is one if there is a 
CSR committee and zero otherwise 
Michelon & Parbonetti (2012); Amran et al. 
(2014)
Reference 
shareholder
If the company is owned by a reference 
shareholder who has the majority of voting 
rights, veto power or golden share. Dummy 
variable. Indicator variable is one if there is a 
reference shareholder and zero otherwise
Miras et al. (2014)
Control
Company size Logarithm of total assets
Said, Zainuddin, & Haron (2009), Amran, Lee, & 
Devi (2014)
Profitability ROA
Michelon & Parbonetti (2012) Rodríguez et al. 
(2014)
Industry Industry ASSET4 data
Based on previous literature about the types of CSR 
disclosure practices and their complexity, we used the “CSR 
Index” which reflects how complex the CSR reporting practices 
are in each company. The index consists of four items (dummy 
variables) that are shown in Exhibit 2.
As independent variables, we focused on the CG 
characteristics that have shown an influence on CSR reporting 
according to the literature: Board Size, Board Independence, 
Board Activity, CSR Committee, and Reference Shareholder. The 
institutional environment was operationalized through a dummy 
variable. This is because there are only two countries involved, 
and the aim of this study is to compare them, rather than go 
further into the origin of differences.
Moreover, we included several control variables related 
to the nature of the company, such as size, profitability, and the 
industry, based on previous findings.
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Regressions and models
Considering the characteristics of our dependent variables 
(categorical, although the differences between them are not 
quantified), we had to use ordinal regression to get consistent 
results. Although other, more complex methodologies could 
be used (such as Structural Equation Models –SEM), we have 
decided to use the ordinal regression technique since (1) there 
were not many hypotheses and variables included, and (2) the 
variables were observable and not composed of several items. 
Ordinal regression minimizes the differences of the sum 
of the squares between the dependent variable and a weighted 
combination of the independent variables. The estimated 
coefficients reflect how changes in the factors affect the level of 
complexity of the CSR reporting practices analyzed.
Therefore, we estimate our models:
1. CSR reporting practices = ß1+ ß2Institutional 
Environment + ß3 Company Size + ß4 ROA + Industry 
effect+ ε
2. CSR reporting practices = ß1+ ß2 Board Size + ß3 Board 
Independence + ß4 Board Activity + ß5 CSR Committee+ 
ß6 Reference Shareholder +ß7 Company Size + ß8 ROA 
+ Industry effect+ ε
3. CSR reporting practices = ß1+ ß2 Board Size + ß3 
Board Independence + ß4 Board Activity + ß5 CSR 
Committee+ ß6 Reference Shareholder +ß7Institutional 
Environment+ ß8 Company Size +ß9 ROA + Industry 
effect+ ε
Goodness of fit was determined by the -2 log of likelihood 
(measured through a χ² distribution) which controls the 
representativeness of each of the equations. If the probability value 
associated was below 0.05, we should reject the null hypothesis, 
accepting that the final ordinal model is relevant from the 
econometric point of view (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 1998).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics 
We present the sample’s distribution of industries by country 
(Table 1), the sample’s descriptive statistics for each country 
(Table 2), and the bivariate correlations between all the variables 
included in the study (Table 4).
Table 1. Distribution of industries by country
Industries Brazil Spain
Aerospace and defense 1.2
Alternative energy 1.2 4.9
Banks 6.0 14.6
Chemicals 1.2
Construction and materials 2.4 7.3
Electricity 14.3 9.8
Electronic and electrical equipment 1.2
Financial services 6.0 4.9
Fixed line telecommunications 2.4 2.4
Food and drug retailers 2.4 2.4
Food producers 7.1 4.9
Forestry and paper 2.4
Gas, water and multi-utilities 3.6 4.9
General industrials 1.2
General retailers 7.1 2.4
Health care equipment and services 2.4
Household goods and home construction 2.4
Industrial engineering 1.2 2.4
Industrial metals and mining 6.0 2.4
Industrial transportation 4.8 2.4
Media 1.2 7.3
Mining 1.2
Mobile telecommunications 1.2
Nonlife insurance 3.6 2.4
Oil and gas producers 3.6 2.4
Oil equipment and services 2.4
Personal goods 2.4
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 7.3
Real estate investment and services 7.1 2.4
Software and computer services 1.2 2.4
Support services 4.9
Tobacco 1.2
Travel and leisure 1.2 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on ASSET4.
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As shown in Table 1, the two main industries in both countries are energy (22.7% for Brazil, 22% for Spain) and financial services 
(13.2% for Brazil, 19.5% for Spain). With regard to the representation of other sectors, Brazilian companies are more dedicated to 
industries and real estate investments, while the percentage of Spanish companies is higher for construction, media, and pharmacy 
and biotechnology. Other industries have little presence in both samples.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Spain and Brazil
Spain Brazil
 N Mean
Standard 
deviation
N Mean
Standard 
deviation
CSR index 41 2.78 1.60 84 2.06 1.65
CSR information disclosure 41 0.82 0.38 84 0.70 0.46
GRI level 41 0.71 0.46 84 0.58 0.49
Externally checked 41 0.63 0.49 84 0.42 0.49
Assurance 41 0.61 0.49 84 0.36 0.48
Board size 41 14.05 3.47 84 9.38 2.53
Independent members (%) 40 30.30 23.09 67 25.66 21.96
BD activity 38 10.79 3.67 39 15.21 13.59
CSR committee 41 0.78 0.42 84 0.69 0.47
Reference shareholder 41 0.27 0.44 84 0.48 0.50
ROA 41 4.72 9.68 84 6.38 7.91
Company size 41 80008608.05 218109043.63 84 71921260.05 199570754.21
Source: Based on ASSET4.
Based on the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2, we 
can see that Spanish companies have higher scores for all CSR 
disclosure practices than Brazilian companies. Nevertheless, these 
data have to be carefully considered and complemented with others 
analyses (Graph 1), since the distribution could not be uniform.
Graph 1. Accumulated percentage of CSR disclosure 
practices in Brazil and Spain
0.8
Brazil
Spain
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4
1
Graph 1 presents the differences found between Brazil and 
Spain concerning CSR disclosure practices. Mean results in Table 
1 are distorted since there is a large group of Spanish companies 
with the maximum score: 52.28% in the case of the CSR Index. 
Nevertheless, intermediate scores for Spanish companies are 
almost non-existent. Furthermore, 18.18% of Spanish companies 
do not carry out any CSR disclosure practice, nor do 29.59% follow 
the GRI guidelines. With regard to the assurance of CSR reports, 
results show that this particular CSR disclosure practice is more 
common in Spanish companies than in Brazilian ones, in line with 
the results of the survey conducted by KPMG (2013). For Brazilian 
companies, these percentages are higher (30.12 %). However, the 
CSR Index for Brazilian companies is better distributed, and not 
so concentrated on the maximum level. 
Based on the comparison of results in Table 2 regarding 
financial measures, we can affirm that the Financial Performance 
of Brazilian companies is higher. Additionally, if we consider 
total assets, Spanish companies are larger than Brazilian ones.
The mean values for both countries’ CG characteristics 
are also shown in Table 2. Indeed, one must consider that 
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each country’s Code of Good Governance gathers several 
recommendations about CG mechanisms (see Exhibit 1). 
Although the recommendations in Brazilian Code seem to go 
further than those in the Spanish Code, this is not reflected in 
our descriptive statistics. Spanish boards are larger, with a higher 
percentage of independents directors, and less active than the 
boards of Brazilian companies. With regard to the existence of a 
CSR Committee, more Spanish companies have one. As for the 
presence of a Reference Shareholder, there are more Brazilian 
than Spanish companies with a Reference Shareholder (48% 
vs 27%).
Additionally, we conducted a test of mean differences to 
find out which CG variables were most affected by the institutional 
environment (Table 3). In this case, Board Size and the existence 
of a Reference Shareholder are the ones showing significant 
statistical differences. Taking these results into account, we could 
accept our third hypothesis. However, it is necessary to note that 
not all CG mechanisms show significant statistical differences 
(only Board Size and Reference Shareholder).
Table 3. Test of mean differences for CG characteristics
Corporate Governance characteristics Test of mean differences
Board size 55.38 **
Independent directors 52.99
Board activity 19.33
CSR committee 1.60
Reference shareholder 6.16 *
Significance test **< 0.005, *<0.05
Source: Based on ASSET4
As shown in Table 4, there is a significant, positive 
correlation between CSR reporting practices and three of the 
independent variables (Board Size, CSR Committee and Reference 
Shareholder). These results support that CSR disclosure decisions 
lie with BDs (Adams, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012).
Table 4. Bivariate correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) CSR index 1                
(2) Board size 0.36** 1              
(3) Independent members -0.05 -0.05 1            
(4) BD activity 0.21 -0.12 -0.03 1          
(5) CSR committee 0.55** 0.27** -0.04 0.16 1        
(6) Reference shareholder 0.27** 0.00 -0.27** 0.013 0.07 1      
(7) Institutional environment 0.19* 0.63** 0.12 -0.23* 0.11 -0.22* 1    
(8) Company size 0.30** 0.09 0.02 0.35** 0.18* 0.12 0.01 1  
(9) ROA 0.05 -0.16 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.15 -0.09 -0.14 1
Significance test ** < 0.01 * < 0.05
Source: Based on ASSET4
With regard to CG variables, we could only find two 
significant correlations: Board size – CSR Committee (positive); 
and Independent Members – Reference Shareholder (negative). 
This evidence is logical and consistent with Boyd’s (1994) 
argument that when there is a Reference Shareholder, several 
directors will be appointed by him/her.
Multivariate tests
All models in the study are statistically relevant according to their 
statistics (-2-log-likelihood), and their results are summarized in 
Tables 7 and 8. Firstly, it is worth highlighting that the institutional 
environment has a strongly significant influence on the complexity 
651
ISSN 0034-7590
AUTHORS | María del Mar Miras Rodríguez | Bernabé Escobar Pérez 
© RAE | São Paulo | V. 56 | n. 6 | nov-dez 2016 | 641-654
of CSR disclosure practices when they are studied separately (see Table 5). This was expected, according with theoretical the 
framework and previous empirical evidence (Adams, 2002; Grecco et al., 2013; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Young & Marais, 2012). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted.
Table 5. Comparison of results of the ordinal regression
Brazil Spain
Coefficient 
estimation
Standard 
deviation
Wald
Coefficient 
estimation
Standard 
deviation
Wald
Company size 2.07 0.46 19.95** -0.90 0.73 1.53
ROA 0.96 0.05 4.62* 0.47 0.24 3.87*
Industry controlled controlled
−2 log likelihood 157.71 42.51
χ² 97.51** 54.39**
Pseudo R² Cox & Snell 0.69 0.74
Significance test ** < 0.005, *<0.05
Source: Based on ASSET4
Once these first analyses were finished, we focused on the ordinal regressions of the models proposed (Table 6). Firstly, 
we found that including CG variables has a positive impact on the explanation of CSR report complexity (R2 increases). Therefore, 
we conclude that CG characteristics affect CSR disclosure (i.e., Hypothesis 1 is accepted). These results are in line with previous 
evidence in this respect.
Table 6. Results of the ordinal regressions
 
CSR Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient 
estimation
Standard 
deviation
Wald
Coefficient 
estimation
Standard 
deviation
Wald
Coefficient 
estimation
Standard 
deviation
Wald
Board size   0.33 0.16 4.42† 0.11 0.22 0.25
Independent 
directors
      0.02 0.02 1.18 0.01 0.02 0.52
Board activity       -0.16 0.11 2.02 -0.17 0.12 2.26
CSR committee       1.52 1.10 1.94 1.79 1.16 2.41
Reference 
shareholder
      1.98 1.06 3.50* 2.52 1.17 4.62*
Institutional 
environment
-1.86 0.53 12.11**       -2.07 1.49 1.91
Company size 1.21 0.23 26.96** 2.03 0.58 12.33** 2.19 0.65 11.35**
ROA 0.09 0.03 6.21* 0.30 0.13 5.62* 0.29 0.13 5.30*
Industry controlled controlled controlled
−2 log likelihood 261.38 91.95 89.85
χ² 103.52** 83.74** 85.84**
Pseudo R² Cox & 
Snell
0.56 0.70 0.71
Significance test ** < 0.005, *<0.05, †<0.1
Source: Based on ASSET4
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However, not all CG mechanisms have a statistical 
significant effect on the dependent variable. Board Size and the 
existence of a Reference Shareholder are the CG mechanisms 
that positively affect CSR disclosure. These results are in line 
with the scarce literature on this subject matter (Young & Marais, 
2012). Previous research has pointed out that the presence of 
independent directors in boards has a positive effect on the level 
of CSR disclosure (Lattemann et al., 2009), although we did not 
confirm this in our findings. This disagreement could be explained 
by the low percentage of external directors in the companies 
included in the sample.
The empirical evidence suggests that the CG mechanisms 
with a strong influence on CSR reporting practices (Board Size 
and Reference Shareholder) are the ones that show significant 
differences according to the institutional environment (see Table 3).
When the impacts of CG mechanisms and institutional 
environment on CSR reporting practices were considered 
simultaneously, we found that the institutional environment was 
no longer significant. The goodness of fit of this model is quite 
close to that of the model which did not consider the institutional 
environment (only a 1% increase). Only one of the CG variables 
(the existence of a Reference Shareholder) continued showing a 
significant influence on CSR disclosure.
At this point, we were able to conclude that the influence 
of the institutional environment on CSR disclosure is mediated 
by both CG mechanisms (Board Size and Reference Shareholder). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is accepted.
With regard to the control variables (size and ROA), our 
results confirmed that company size and profitability have a 
positive impact on the complexity of CSR disclosure practices, 
although in some cases, the significance of that impact decreased 
when CG variables were included in the models. All regressions 
were also controlled by industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Considering that the aim of this paper is to analyze whether the 
effect of the institutional environment on CSR reporting practices 
is direct or if this effect can be explained by the influence that 
the institutional environment has on CG mechanisms, we can 
conclude that CG mechanisms mediate the influence that the 
institutional environment has on CSR reporting practices. Not 
all CG characteristics were found to be determinant, i.e., only 
Board Size and the existence of a Reference Shareholder were 
found to have a significant impact on the complexity of those 
reporting practices. 
This research reveals that it is strongly relevant to know and 
study the regulation and recommendations concerning CG-related 
issues for each country (which are reflected on each country’s 
Code of Good Governance) as well as their actual implementation 
in companies since CG features could be decisive for several 
strategic decisions, particularly policies of voluntary disclosure.
Specifically, our study focused on comparing two 
institutional environments (Rule-Based and Relation-based). Our 
results support that CSR disclosure complexity is higher in Rule-
Based institutional environments.
The main contribution of this study is our finding that the higher 
complexity of the CSR information disclosed in Rule-Based societies 
comes from the effect of these societies’ institutional environment 
on CG mechanisms. Therefore, as Relation-Based societies evolve 
into Rules-Based environments, the information disclosed about 
Corporate Social Responsibility becomes more complex due to a 
strengthening of Corporate Governance mechanisms.
Our results suggest that further investigations should be 
conducted including more countries in the sample. Moreover, 
future research on this topic might consider using other statistical 
techniques such as SEM.
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